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SHELLY F. MURPHY, 
Plaintiffs/ Appellants, 
vs. 
CROSLAND INDUSTRIES, INC.; a 
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corporation; TODD CROSLAND; 
JEFF CROSLAND and REX 
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Defendant, Appellees, 
and Cross-Appellant. 
Case No. 930249-CA 
Priority 15 
AMENDED REPLY BRIEF OF CROSS-APPElLANT JEFF CROSLAND1 
STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS 
1. The trial court has held that at the time Jeff Crosland executed the guaranty 
on behalf, and in his capacity as an officer, of Crosland Industries, Inc. ("Crosland 
Industries"), Crosland Industries was a de jure corporation. (R. at 549:14-23). 
2. Plaintiffs Brian and Shelly Murphy (the "Murphys") conceded in the trial 
court that at the time he executed the guaranty, Jeff Crosland did not know that Crosland 
1This Amended Reply Brief of Cross-Appellant Jeff Crosland is submitted because the table 
of contents and tabk of authorities was inadvertently omitted from the original reply brief 
previously filed with the Court. Also, counsel for Jeff Crosland has discovered there was a problem 
with the right-hand margins of the footnotes in the original reply brief, as well as a few 
typographical errors. Those problems have been corrected here. 
1 
Industries had been suspended. (R. at 543:19-20)("they didn't even know the corporation 
was suspended let alone dissolved."). See also (R. at 545:22-15)(" ... [Todd] Crosland 
negotiated and authorized [Jeff Crosland] to sign a guarantee on behalf of the 
corporation. That was done during the suspension period for dissolution and before he 
even knew it was suspended ... "). 
3. Todd Crosland ran the day to day operations of Crosland Industries, and 
Jeff Crosland had virtually no involvement in running the corporation. (R. at 153:8-22)(" . 
. . Q. So you [Todd Crosland] basically were running the show, then? A. Correct.") 
4. The Murphys admitted to the trial court that at the time they negotiated for, 
and obtained Jeff Crosland's signature on, the guaranty, they relied entirely upon Crosland 
Industries' corporate statute, as opposed to relying upon the assets of the individual 
officers and directors. (R. at 98)(" ... my wife and I believed and relied in good faith 
upon the representation that Defendant [Crosland Industries] was a validly existing 
corporation at that time."). 
ARGUMENT 
I. 1HE 1990 AMENDMENT TO UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-882(1) 
CONS1TIUIF.S A SUBSTANTIVE CHANGE TO EXISilNG lAW AND, 
11-IEREFORE, CANNOT BE APPLIED REIROACTIVELY. 
A The Murphys' Interpretation of the 1990 Amendment is 
Erroneous. 
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-88.2(1)(as amended March 8, 1990) provides as follows: 
A domestic corporation that remains delinquent for more than 30 days after 
the mailing of the notice of delinquency under Section 16-10-88.1 shall be 
suspended. If a corporation is suspended under this section or under 
Section 59-7-155, the division shall mail a notice of suspension to the 
corporation, unless the corporation's certificate of incorporation is already 
suspended for any reason. A corporation that is suspended continues its 
2 
corporate existence and may carry on anv business so long as it also takes 
the necessary steps to remedv its suspended status and restore the 
corporation to good standing. 
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-88.2(1)(as amended March 8, 1990)(emphasis added 
reflecting the language added to the statute). This amendment is a substantive change 
to the then existing statute and cannot, therefore, be applied retroactively. 
The Murphys' principal argument concerning the effect of this amendment is that 
because "[t]he title to House Bill 185 (the 1990 legislation amending section 16-10-88.2(1)) 
identifies it as 'Procedural Amendments To The Nonprofit and Business Corporations 
Acts' ... [and t]he preamble to House Bill 185 describes it as An Act Relating To 
Corporations; ... Clarifying Certain Procedures Regarding Suspension."' (the Murphys' 
Brief at 4), then all of the 1990 amendments to the Utah Business Corporations Act are 
merely procedural and/ or clarifying amendments and, therefore, should be applied 
retroactively. 
The fatal flaw with the Murphys' argument, however, is that many of the 1990 
amendments are clearly substantive and were never intended to be retroactive. For 
example, the 1990 amendment to Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-88.2(e) provided that a 
suspended corporation would be dissolved 120 days after the date of mailing of the notice 
of suspension if the corporation failed to remove the suspension prior to the expiration 
of that 120 day period, as opposed to the one year period that existed in the statute prior 
to the 1990 amendment. Clearly, the change from one year to 120 days is substantive and 
could not be applied retroactively. Similarly, the language which was added to Utah Code 
3 
Ann. § 16-10-88.2(1) m 1990 1s a substantive change which was not intended to be 
retroactive. 2 
The Murphys' also erroneously rely on Gillham Advertising Agency, Inc. v. Ipson, 
567 P.2d 163 (Utah 1977) as support for their contention that the 1990 amendment was 
procedural and merely clarified existing law. Gillham is, however, simply not applicable 
to the instant case. In Gillham, the majority opinion noted the following key facts: 
(1) There was a Nevada corporation named Bonneville Raceways Park. 
(2) 
(3) [Defendant] Ipson tried to qualify his corporation to do business in 
Utah, but was unable to do so because there was a Utah corporation by the 
same name. 
(4) 
(5) Ipson leased the racetrack personally and began operating it. 
( 6) Ipson contacted Gillham Advertising Agency, Inc. to promote the 
racing activity which he personally was conducting. 
(7) Gillham conducted the advertising and advanced money in 
connection therewith. 
(8) When Ipson failed to pay, a written agreement was prepared covering 
the fees and setting a time and the conditions of payment thereof. 
(9) Ipson executed the agreement by signing "Bonneville Raceways by 
Robert K. Ipson, President." 
(10) The debt was not paid and this action was commenced. 
(11) 
(12) Bonneville Raceways Park, a Nevada corporation, was suspended in Nevada. 
(13) 
Gillham, 567 P.2d at 164 (emphasis added). Based upon the foregoing facts, the 
Utah Supreme Court stated: 
2Jeff Crosland does not dispute the general rule that "[i]n cases of doubt or uncertainty, the tile 
or preamble of a statute may be looked to as an aid in correctly interpreting and applying the 
statute." Shelter America Corp. v. Ohio Casualty & Ins. Co., 745 P.2d 843, 845 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
However, the mere fact the preamble calls a statute "procedural" or "clarifying· does not mean every 
single new amendment is procedural, and does not rule out the possibility that one or more changes 
may be substantive. Moreover, Utah law is clear that "later versions of a statute do not necessarily 
reveal the intent behind an earlier version." Luckau v. Board of Review of the Industrial Comm'n of 
Utah, 840 P.2d 811, 816 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
4 
There is no question but that the debt is Ipson's. When he failed to pay, 
a paper was prepared to set forth with particularity how and when the debt 
would be paid. That paper did not extinguish the debt owed by Ipson; it 
merely stated how and under what circumstances it would be paid. There 
is no evidence or claim that there was a novation whereby the corporation 
would owe the debt and Ipson would be released from paying it~ 
I d. at 164 (emphasis added). Thus, the finding of liability in Gillham was premised on 
the fact that from the very beginning, the debt was an individual debt of [pson, not a debt 
of any corporation.3 
In support of their interpretation of Gillham, the Murphys cite Loveridge v. 
Dreagoux, 678 F.2d 878, 877 (lOth Cir. 1982). However, the Loveric~ case did not 
involve application of Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-88.2(1), inasmuch as the conduct in 
question occurred prior to the date the corporation as issue in the case was incorporated. 
Moreover, the court in Loveridge ignores the Utah Supreme Court's finding in Gillham 
that the debt was, from the beginning, an individual debt of Ipson. Simply stated, the 
Loveridge court's interpretation of Gillham is erroneous and should not be followed here. 
B. The Other Cases Upon Which The Mmphys Rely A.re 
Inapposite And Are Not Applicable Here. 
In their brief filed in opposition to Jeff Crosland's appeal, the Murphys cite a 
variety of cases, all but one from other jurisdictions, as support for the imposition of 
3 Although clearly not required to do so in light of its finding that the debt was an individual 
debt of Ipson, the court in Gillham went on to set forth. in dicta, an alternative theory of liability 
for Ipson. The court specifically noted that although ~Ipson claims that the defunct Nevada 
corporation named Bonneville Raceways Park ... did business in Utah under the name of another 
corporation .. :, it did not do business in Utah under the name of Bonneville Raceways, ~as [Ipson] 
signed [the agreement]". Gillham, 567 P.2d at 164. Thus, ~[b]y signing the agreement as he did [i.e. 
as Bonneville Raceways], Mr. Ipson made himself liable even if it had been an original obligation 
because there was no such corporation of which he was president [i.e.-no Bonneville Racewaysr 
Id. at 165. 
5 
personal liability upon Jeff Crosland. However, those case are inapposite and are not 
applicable here. 
With respect to Mackay & Knobel Enterprises, Inc. v. Teton Van Gas, Inc., 23 
Utah 2d 200, 460 P.2d 828 (1969), the question of whether a corporate officer may be 
held personally liable for acts done on behalf of the corporation while the corporation was 
suspended was not even remotely at issue. However, with respect to the purpose of 
suspension, the Utah Supreme Court did note that "suspension is intended primarily to 
affect the relationship between the corporation and the state; .... " Id. at 830. 
With respect to Carolina Transformer Co. v. Anderson, 341 So. 2d 1327 (Miss. 
1977), the Murphys misstate the holding of the case, and fail to note the real reasons the 
court imposed personal liability upon the defendant. The Mississippi Supreme Court 
stated: 
... at the time of the [initial] negotiations with [plaintiff, the defendant] 
was operating Tranco as a sole proprietorship. The company was not 
incorporated until some three or four months after the sales agreement was 
entered into. . . . The record shows no renegotiation with carolina 
Transformer when Tranco was incorporated. Neither does it show that 
Carolina had any notice whatsoever that the status of Tranco ever changed 
from a sole proprietorship to a corporation. . . . Absent any notice to 
Carolina Transformer of a change of identity as to Tranco, under the 
circumstances of the case the sole proprietor (Anderson) remained liable 
for credit extended to the corporation. 
Id. at 1329. It is also important to note that the court in Carolina Transformer makes no 
mention as to whether Mississippi had a statutory provision similar to the version of Utah 
Code Ann. § 16-10-88.2(1) prior to the 1990 amendment. 
With respect to Phillips & Strong Eng. Co. v. Howard B. James Assoc., Inc., 529 
P.2d 1013 (Okla. Ct. App. 1974), the Murphys fail to inform the court that unlike the 
6 
instant case, personal liability was imposed based upon an Oklahoma statute which 
provides: 
(c) Each trustee, director or officer of any such corporation, association or 
organization, whose right to do business with this State shall be so forfeited, 
shall, as to any and all debts of such corporation, association or 
organization, which may be created or incurred with his knowledge, 
approval and consent, within this State after such forfeiture and before the 
reinstatement of the right of such corporation to do business, be deemed 
and held liable thereon in the same manner and to the same extent as if 
such trustees, directors, and officers of such corporation, association or 
organization were partners. 
Id. at 1015 n. 1. No such statute is at issue here, and it would be a real stretch for the 
Murphys to argue that the Oklahoma statute is similar to the Utah statute at issue here. 
With respect to Priceco, Inc. v. Youngstrom, 117 Idaho 213, 786 P.2d 606 (Ct. App. 
1990), the corporation at issue had forfeited its charter - the corporation had not simply 
been suspended. The distinction between forfeiture and suspension is. crucial because 
under Idaho law, it is '"unlawful for any forfeited domestic or foreign corporation to 
exercise its corporate powers or to transact any business in this state' ... A forfeited 
corporation cannot be sued, nor can judgment be entered against it, in its corporate 
name." ld. at 609 (quoting Idaho Code § 30-1-35). Thus, the Idaho law of forfeiture is 
much different that the Utah law of suspension, which clearly provided that the 
corporation continued to exist during the period of suspension. Moreover, even under the 
Idaho principle of forfeiture, the Idaho court noted that personal liability would be 
imposed only upon "those officers who have actual or constructive knowledge of the 
corporation's forfeiture .... " Id. at 610. Yet here, the Murphys conceded below that at 
the time Jeff Crosland executed the guaranty on behalf of Crosland Industries, Jeff had 
7 
no knowledge that the corporation had been suspended. See Statement of Additional 
Facts, supra at 1, -« 2. 
With respect to Kessler Distributing Co. v. Neill, 317 N.W.2d 519 (Iowa Ct. App. 
1982), as with the Priceco case upon which the Murphys rely, the Iowa legislature had 
adopted the principle of forfeiture, as opposed to the Utah concept of suspension. See 
id. at 520 ("Big Valley's corporate charter was forfeited ... "). Thus, Kessler is inapposite 
and is not applicable here. 
ll. EVEN IF TilE 1990 AMENDMENT TO SECTION 16-10-882(1) IS 
MERELY PROCEDURAL, WHICH IT IS NOT, UTAH CODE ANN.§ 
16-10-139 DOES NOT IMPOSE ABSOLUTE PERSONAL UABIT.ITY 
UPON JEFF CROSLAND. 
In essence, the Murphys argue that Utah Code Ann.§ 16-10-139 imposes absolute 
and unconditional liability upon Jeff Crosland. Such an application of the statute not only 
violates well accepted principles of equity, it is contrary to the intent and purpose of the 
statutory provision. 
A Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-139 Imposes Personal liability Only 
Upon Persons Who Make No Bona Fide Effort To Achieve 
Corporate Status. 
As the Murphys must surely concede, "legislative intent is the guiding principle of 
statutory construction." Micciche v. Billings, 727 P.2d 367, 371 (Colo. 1986). Accordingly, 
this court must determine whether, given the legislative intent behind section 16-10-139, 
the trial court erred in its determination that Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-139 imposes 
absolute and unconditional liability upon Jeff Crosland. 
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-139 "is identical to section 139 of the 1950 Model 
Business Corporation Act, which was designed to impose personal liability in those 
8 
situations in which person hold themselves out and improperly act as a corporation 
without having made any good faith effort to achieve corporate status under state law:·4 
Micciche, 727 P.2d at 370. The Colorado Supreme Court further noted: 
The purpose of [section 139] was to impose personal liability upon those 
persons who take it upon themselves to act as a corporation without having 
undertaken any bona fide effort to achieve corporate status by complying 
with the statutory requirements for incorporation. 
I d. at 371 (citing 1 Model Business Corporation Act Ann. § 2.04 comment at 130--33). 
The Colorado court also noted that: 
Because courts, however, continued to permit limited liability in situations 
where individuals reasonably but erroneously believed that they had 
authority to act as a corporation ... the drafters of the Model Act. amended 
section 146 [originally designated as section 139] in 1985 in order to reflect 
the more flexible standard expressed in case law. 1 Model Business Corp. 
Act Annat. § 2.04 comment at 130-33. The current provision, renumbered 
section 2.04 and entitled Liability for Preincorporation Transactions, reads: 
"All persons purporting to act as or on behalf of a corporation, knowing 
there was no incorporation under this Act, are jointly and severally liable 
for all liabilities created while so acting:·5 
Micciche, 727 P.2d at 370. In light of what the Colorado Supreme Court indicated was 
the clear legislative intent of section 139 of the Model Act, the court went on to hold: 
it would be anomalous in the extreme to construe section 7-3-·104 in a 
manner that exposes corporate officers to substantial legal obligations solely 
on the basis of the corporation's failure to seek reinstatement. We thus 
4The Colorado version of section 139 of the 1950 Model Business Corporation Act is identical 
to Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-139. Compare 3 C.R.S. § 7-3-104 (1973) with Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-
139. 
5utah has recently adopted a statutory provision virtually identical to sectioill 2.04 of the 
amended Model Act. See Utah Code Ann. 16-10A-204. This statutory provision, which is entitled 
"Liability for Preincorporation Transactions" provides: 
All persons purporting to act as or on behalf of a corporation, knowing there was no 
incorporation under this chapter, are jointly and severally liable for all liabilities 
created while so acting. 
9 
limit the scope of section 7-3-104 to those instances when persons act as a 
corporation without making any bona fide effort to achieve corporate status 
by complying with the statutory requirement for incorporation. 
Id. at 372. 
The Micciche court's interpretation of the statutory language in question here is 
also supported by case law upon which the Murphys rely in their brief in opposition to 
Jeff Crosland's appeal. As noted above, the Idaho Court of Appeals has held that 
personal liability should be "limited to those officers who have actual or constructive 
knowledge of the corporation's forfeiture .... " Priceco, 786 P.2d at 610. The Idaho court 
further noted: "For obvious reasons, the courts are reluctant to impose personal liability 
upon officers who-through no fault of their own-are unaware of a forfeiture .... " Id.; see 
also Clark-Franklin-Kingston Press, Inc. v. Romano, 512 Conn. App. 121, 529 A2d 240 
(1987)(holding that personal liability would not be imposed where all parties involved 
believed, in good faith, that there was a corporate existence). 
In the instant case, the Murphys have admitted that at the time he signed the 
guaranty of behalf of Crosland Industries, Jeff Crosland did not know the corporation had 
been suspended. See Statement of Additional Fact, supra at 1, '11 2. Nor has there been 
any assertion by the Murphys that Jeff Crosland should have known about the suspension. 
Rather, the record below is clear that Todd Crosland is the person who ran the day to day 
operations of the company, and Jeff Crosland had virtually no involvement in running the 
corporation. Id. at '11 3. Accordingly, Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-139 does not impose 
personal liability upon Jeff Crosland, and the trial court's determination of absolute and 
unconditional liability is erroneous and should be reversed. 
10 
B. The Murphys' Argument That Section 16-10-139 Imposes 
Absolute And Unconditional Liability Is Contrary To Well 
Accepted Principles Of Equity. 
Although no reported Utah case has apparently addressed the issue, the doctrine 
of corporation by estoppel is well accepted in other jurisdictions. See,~~. Clark-Franklin, 
529 A.2d at 243; see also Harry Rich Corp. v. Feinberg, 518 So. 2d 377, 379 (Fla. Ct. App. 
1987). Under this theory, "private litigants are estopped to assert the nonexistence of the 
corporation if they have by their conduct or words affirmed or relied on its existence."6 
Harry Rich, 518 So. 2d at 379. Under this theory, where a corporate officer believes, in 
good faith, that the corporation exists, and where the creditor also believes the 
corporation exists and relies solely on the corporate entity in entering into a transaction, 
the creditor is estopped from seeking to impose personal liability on the corporate officer. 
Id. As stated by the Florida Court of Appeals: 
Fairness dictates that a creditor dealing with what it believes to be a 
corporation should be able to recover from that entity .... To provide this 
same creditor with the unconditional right to recover from the individual-
when the creditor at no time believed it was dealing with or could look to 
the individual-is to give to the creditor the unjustified right to recover from 
two defendants. 
Id. at 381. 
In the instant case, the Murphys argued below that at the time they negotiated for, 
and obtained Jeff Crosland's signature on, the guaranty, they relied entirely upon Crosland 
Industries' corporate statute, as opposed to relying upon the assets of the individual 
officers and directors. See Statement of Additional Facts, supra at 2, q[ 4. Furthermore, 
6 Although perhaps somewhat similar to the doctrine of de facto corporations, which doctrine 
was clearly abolished by the Model Act, the doctrine of corporation by estoppel survives the Model 
Act and continues to exist as a valid equitable theory. Harry Rich, 518 So. 2d at 379, 381. 
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the record is clear that Jeff Crosland had no knowledge that the corporation had been 
suspended. ld. at en 2. Accordingly, the trial court's imposition of personal liability upon 
Jeff Crosland is erroneous and the judgment should be reversed. 
m TilE MURPHYS' ARGUMENf TIIAT JEFF CROSLAND ADMI'ITED 
TilE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES MISCONSTRUES TilE RECORD AND 
IGNORES WELL ACCEYI'ED PRINCIPLES OF UfAH LAW. 
In response to Jeff Crosland's argument on the issue of damages, the Murphys 
argue simply that Jeff Crosland admitted the amount of damages by failing to controvert 
the amount of the judgment entered against Crosland Industries. The Murphys' argument 
misses the point. To this day, Jeff Crosland does not dispute the fact that the Murphys 
have obtained a judgment against Crosland Industries as set forth in that judgment. 
However, that the Murphys have obtained a default judgment against the corporation, in 
an action to which Jeff Crosland was not a party, does not entitle them to forego putting 
on proof of their damages as against Jeff Crosland, and clearly violates well-established 
notions of due process. See Tintic Indian Chief Mining & Milling Co. v. Clyde, 79 Utah 
337, 10 P.2d 932 (1932)(findings in a prior lawsuit against corporation is not binding 
against non-parties to the prior litigation). 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment against Jeff Crosland should be 
reversed, and the trial court should be directed to enter an order dismissing, with 
prejudice, the Murphys' claims against Jeff Crosland. Alternatively, the damages portion 
of the judgment should be reversed and this matter remanded for a trial on the issue of 
damages. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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DATED this/ ;1"-1 day of January, 1994. 
PARSONS, DAVIES, KINGHORN & PETERS 
310 South Main Street, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Counsel for Jeff Crosland 
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